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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Incentives tripled from 1990 
to 2015, increasing from 9 
percent of state/local business 
taxes to 30 percent.
 
n Incentives often vary 
by a factor of 2 or 3 to 1 
across nearby states, for no 
clear economic reason and 
with no obvious economic 
consequences.
n States underinvest 
in customized business 
services and overinvest 
in tax incentives for 
low-wage businesses and 
long-term incentives.
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In March 2017 the Upjohn Institute released 
a new, publicly accessible database on economic 
development incentives, which are those offered 
by state and local governments as their “usual 
deal” to entice a business to locate a new facility. 
(The database is housed on the Upjohn Institute’s 
website: www.upjohn.org/models/bied/home.php.) 
These incentives include property tax abatements, 
job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, and 
R&D tax credits. They also include customized 
job training programs, under which community 
colleges provide a new facility with training for new 
workers that is customized to the facility’s needs. 
No other study of incentives is as comprehensive 
in covering diverse industries and lengthy time 
periods. Using data from 1990 to 2015, the “Panel 
Database on Incentives and Taxes” estimates 
marginal business taxes and business incentives for 
45 industries in 33 states; the industries compose 91 
percent of U.S. labor compensation, and the states 
produce over 92 percent of U.S. economic output. 
The database has data for a new facility starting 
up in each of 26 “start years.” Compared to prior 
studies, the new database provides more incentive 
details, such as how incentives are broken down 
by different incentive types (e.g., job creation tax 
credits vs. property tax abatements), and the time 
pattern by which incentives are paid out over a 
facility’s life cycle. 
The purpose of this new database is to help 
researchers and policymakers learn more about 
incentives and their effectiveness. Without 
knowing how different incentives vary over time 
and across industries for different states, it is 
impossible to conduct any meaningful incentives 
research or to subject incentives to any informed 
public debate. Do incentive differences across 
states, industries, or time lead to any significant 
effects on an industry’s growth in a state? Do 
incentives allocate more U.S. growth to needier 
areas or to industries that might boost national 
productivity? Without incentives data, such 
questions cannot begin to be addressed. 
In addition to being downloadable, the database 
is analyzed in an accompanying report (Bartik 
2017) that focuses on 31 “export-base” industries, 
which are those that sell their goods and services 
outside the state but not necessarily outside the 
country. Such industries provide the base for a 
state’s economy by bringing new money into the 
state. This article highlights the main findings in 
the report. 
Incentives are Large Compared to State and 
Local Business Taxes but Modest as a Share of 
Overall Costs 
Incentives for the average state’s base industries 
in 2015 offset around 30 percent of what otherwise 
would be charged in state and local business taxes. 
Incentives play a significant role in state and local 
taxes and budgets. 
On the other hand, incentives for base 
industries average about 1.4 percent of business 
value-added, a measure of the value of the 
business’s production. (Business value-added 
is defined as the business’s sales minus what it 
purchases from other businesses.) Incentives can 
be offset by modest variations in other business 
costs, such as wages. 
Incentives Tripled from 1990 to 2015 
Average incentives increased from 9 percent of 
business taxes in 1990 to 30 percent in 2015. As 
shown in Figure 1, this increase was most rapid 
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The typical state does little industry 
targeting—for example, higher-
wage industries do not receive 
significantly higher incentives.
in the 1990s. In the past decade, some 
states have significantly expanded 
incentives while other states have made 
cuts. 
Incentives Vary Greatly across 
Nearby States, with No Obvious 
Strong Correlation with a State’s 
Economic Past or Future 
As shown in Figure 2, incentives 
often vary by a factor of 2 to 1 or 
more across nearby states. These 
incentive differences are not tied to a 
state’s unemployment, so incentives 
are not reallocating jobs to high 
unemployment areas. 
Incentive differences do not appear 
to have large effects on state economic 
growth by industry. The database 
suggests incentive effects toward the 
low end of prior estimates: the average 
incentive package, 1.4 percent of value-
added, might tip the location decision 
of 6 percent of incented businesses—
the other 94 percent of the time, the 
state would have experienced similar 
growth without the incentive. 
This typical 6 percent tip rate of 
incentives is a low batting average. 
To have benefits greater than costs, 
incentives must do something special—
they either need unusually high 
benefits per job created, or incentive 
designs must exceed the typical batting 
average, lowering costs per job created. 
Higher benefits per incented job 
can be achieved if incentives target 
high-wage or high-tech industries. 
High-wage industries obviously are 
good for those industries’ workers. In 
addition, because higher-wage workers 
have more income to spend at local 
retailers, such industries will have 
higher multiplier effects in creating 
other local jobs. Because high-tech 
industries tend to cluster, incented 
high-tech jobs might also have higher 
multipliers, with each induced high-
tech job creating five other local jobs 
(Moretti 2010). 
Incentives Vary Little 
across Industries
Even though some industries offer 
much greater benefits, the typical 
state does little industry targeting. 
As shown in Figure 3, higher-wage 
industries do not receive significantly 
higher incentives. Incentives do not 
particularly target high-tech, as each 
extra 10 percent of industry R&D 
spending only increases incentives by 
0.3 percent. 
Incentives are Excessively Long Term
Incentives are more effective if they 
are more up front. Because business 
executives tend to think in the short 
term, an incentive today is more 
effective at inducing location decisions 
than an incentive that is only paid out 
10 years from now. The average state 
has incentives that are still 1.1 percent 
of business value-added when a 
facility is in its tenth year of operation. 
Reducing such long-term incentives 
would lower long-term government 
costs of incentives without having 
much effect on job creation. 
States Underinvest in Customized 
Business Services 
Incentives designed as customized 
services may be more effective than tax 
incentives. For example, customized 
job training is a very effective incentive. 
Research suggests that, per dollar, 
customized job training might be 10 
times more effective than tax incentives 
in encouraging local business growth 
(Hollenbeck [2008]; Hoyt, Jepsen, and 
Troske [2008]; see also Holzer et al. 
[1993]). Other effective customized 
services include manufacturing 
extension programs, which have been 
shown to improve productivity (Jarmin 
1998). 
Why are such customized services 
more cost-effective? They tend to be 
more targeted than tax incentives at 
small and medium-sized businesses, 
whose location and expansion behavior 
is easier to affect than large businesses’. 
Because obtaining quality job training 
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Figure 1  Incentives as a Percent of Business Taxes, 1990–2015
NOTE: Chart shows the average magnitude of state and local business incentives as a percent of state and local 
business taxes, 1990–2015.
SOURCE:  Author’s calculations.
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services or business advice may be 
difficult for smaller businesses to 
do on their own, the value of such 
services may exceed their costs. Finally, 
customized services provide up-front 
assistance, helping the business be 
more productive immediately. 
However, despite the greater cost-
effectiveness of customized services, 
state and local incentives are more 
focused on tax incentives. For example, 
the typical state only spends $1 on 
customized job training for every $20 
devoted to tax incentives. 
Summary
While these conclusions are based 
on preliminary analysis of the “Panel 
Database on Incentives and Taxes,” 
the database allows for much more 
extensive examinations of different 
types of incentives for each state for 
diverse industries. Such detailed 
analyses can play an important role 
in the growing national movement 
toward subjecting incentives to 
greater transparency, evaluation, and 
accountability. According to the Pew 
Charitable Trusts (2016), “Since 2012, 
22 states and the District of Columbia 
have enacted laws requiring regular, 
rigorous, independent evaluation of tax 
incentives.” In addition, in 2015, the 
Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board adopted a new reporting 
standard, GASB 77, under which state 
and local governments that comply 
with “generally accepted accounting 
principles” must annually report at least 
the aggregate revenue foregone from 
each tax incentive program (Good Jobs 
First 2015). The database complements 
GASB 77 reports by providing more 
long-term and industry-detailed 
information on incentives. It supports 
state incentive evaluations by 
facilitating comparisons across states, 
industries, and incentive types. With 
better data and evaluation of incentives, 
state and local governments over time 
can reform such incentives to increase 
their benefits for state residents relative 
to costs. 
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NOTE: Chart shows state and local business incentives as a percent of business value-added across three pairs 
of adjacent states as of 2015.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Figure 2  Incentives across Nearby States as a Percent of Value-Added, 2015
Figure 3  Comparison of Incentives vs. Wages across Industries, as of 2015
NOTE: Each dot represents 1 of 31 export-base industries. The vertical axis shows the national average for state 
and local business incentives for that industry, as a percent of that industry’s value-added. The horizontal 
axis shows the industry’s average wages per full-time equivalent worker.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Policy analysts, economists, and 
demographers argue that individuals 
must extend their work lives if they 
are to achieve their desired standards 
of living in retirement. Increases in 
longevity imply that those who leave 
the labor force at traditional retirement 
ages must either save more during 
their working careers or consume less 
during their retirement. 
The logic behind later retirement 
from the employee’s perspective is 
clear and has been studied in detail: 
remaining in the labor force for 
additional years is needed to support 
increasing years in retirement. 
However, relatively few studies have 
directly addressed how employers 
feel about having workers remain on 
the job until older ages. Our book, 
Extending Work Life: Can Employers 
Adapt When Employees Want to Delay 
Retirement?, which was recently 
published by the Upjohn Institute 
(see p. 7), seeks to fill this gap by 
providing a comprehensive assessment 
of the costs and benefits to employers 
of accommodating later retirement 
ages. Through their employment and 
compensation policies, employers can 
either assist or restrict workers’ ability 
to remain on the job. 
Economic theory of the firm 
indicates that companies determine 
the optimal number of workers to 
hire and the appropriate age and skill 
composition of their workforces. A 
firm will need a mix of employees of 
different skill types, skill levels, and 
vintages of human capital. Changes in 
the age structure of a firm’s workforce 
due to delayed retirement can affect 
labor costs, productivity, profitability, 
and sustainability. Companies develop 
their compensation policies to attract, 
retain, motivate, and ultimately retire 
their desired workforces. As a result, 
shifts in worker preferences may lead 
to changes in company policies.
Employers must consider the 
advantages and costs of retaining 
or hiring older workers. Older 
workers often are relatively highly 
compensated, and some will experience 
diminished productivity at older ages. 
Furthermore, as employers retain 
older workers, the opportunities for 
advancement by younger workers 
might be restricted. Employers must 
address the changing demographics 
in their workforces. By creating 
compensation and employment 
policies to accommodate prolonged 
or delayed retirement transitions, 
employers will be better positioned to 
reap the benefits of employing older 
workers. 
What factors influence a firm’s 
willingness to retain older workers? 
Can companies develop transitional 
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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Between 1994 and 2014, the labor force participation rate for men aged 65–69 rose 
from 27 to 36 percent.
n By creating compensation and employment policies to accommodate prolonged or 
delayed retirement transitions, employers will be better positioned to reap the benefits 
of employing older workers.
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